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During the 1980s a significant source of Japanese growth – and a major source of concern for 
Japan’s trading partners – was the widely admired innovative capacity of Japanese firms.  
Over the course of the decade, Japanese firms entered and successfully competed in high-
tech industries that had formerly been the preserve of US and European multinationals.  
Japanese firms’ expanding innovative capacity was clearly reflected in aggregate statistics on 
R&D expenditures, patenting, and productivity, all of which showed a steady increase in 
R&D input and output.  A mid-decade study by the National Academy of Engineering (1987) 
concluded that Japan was superior to the United States in 25 of 34 “critical” technologies.
1
  This situation changed quite dramatically over the course of the 1990s.  R&D 
spending by the private sector in Japan has stagnated during the Heisei recession.  Measures 
of R&D output growth in Japan have declined relative to the United States and relative to 
Japanese historical trends.  There is a widespread sense among Japanese R&D managers, 
industry observers, and government officials that the Japanese approach to technological 
innovation is no longer working effectively, and fundamental reform of the national 
innovation system must take place.
2 
  It is important to note that technological factors have not been the primary drivers of 
the Heisei recession.  Rather, the collapse of asset prices, the resulting crisis in the banking 
system, and the inappropriate macroeconomic policy responses of the Japanese government 
since the early 1990s have arguably been the primary cause.
3  However, the implications of 
the apparent decline in Japanese innovative capacity are potentially quite serious for Japan’s 
long-run economic prospects.  When normal growth resumes, the maximum sustainable rate 
will depend in part on the ability of Japanese firms to develop and deploy new technology.  If 
Japan’s innovative capacity is growing at a slower rate than in past decades, this could limit 
Japan’s future prospects. 
  This chapter examines Japan’s R&D performance from the early 1980s using several 
complementary modes of analysis.  First, we examine evidence from aggregate economic 
statistics concerning changes in Japanese R&D.  Second, we analyze comprehensive data on 
                     
1 See Okimoto and Saxonhouse (1987), Arison et al (1992), and Mansfield (1988). A book-length treatment is Goto (1993). 
 
2 For a recent English article which quotes pessimistic Japanese experts at length on this subject, see Normile (2002) 
 




R&D inputs and outputs for a panel of nearly 200 Japanese firms.  Microeconometric 
analysis of this data set allows us to examine where any downturn in R&D activity is 
concentrated, what Japanese firms are themselves doing to rectify the downturn in 
performance, and what effects these steps have had to date.  Third, we relate the results of 10 
interviews of corporate R&D managers and informed industry observers concerning their 
perceptions of changes in Japanese innovative capacity and the reasons for these changes. 
  The main empirical contribution of this chapter is to document, at the micro level and 
the aggregate level, a slowdown in the growth rate of Japanese research productivity. 
We find that after a decade of convergence with the United States in terms of R&D inputs 
and outputs in the 1980s, Japanese and US innovation trends have diverged sharply in the 
1990s.  Measured in a common currency, real R&D outlays in Japan have grown much more 
slowly than in the United States.  The gap in patent output that was closing rapidly in the 
1980s began expanding again in the 1990s. 
  Firm-level data show evidence of a slowdown in the growth of R&D productivity in 
Japan in the 1990s, controlling for R&D spending and other firm attributes.  This slowdown 
does not affect all firms equally. By and large, the research productivity of the electronics 
industry, broadly defined, has continued to grow in line with the trends of the 1980s and 
early 1990s.  On the other hand, firms outside the electronics industry have performed less 
well. 
  Why has Japanese R&D productivity grown more slowly in the 1990s?  A full-
fledged investigation of this question is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, drawing 
on our interviews with Japanese R&D managers and evidence from other economic studies, 
we are able to present some possible explanations.  As they have reached the technology 
frontier, Japanese firms have had to re-orient their R&D efforts from the application and 
refinement of existing, relatively well-developed technology to the creation of more 
fundamental breakthroughs.
4 
  The shortage of PhD-level engineers and the relative weakness of Japanese academic 
science may have inhibited the effectiveness of such technologically more ambitious R&D in 
Japan.  Furthermore, attempts to create large, centralized corporate labs focused on more 
basic R&D have apparently run into the same problems that large-scale US corporate R&D 
labs were criticized for in the 1980s, including a lack of focus on the needs of a rapidly 
                     





5  Finally, the absence of a venture capital industry and the types of 
institutions that support start-ups in the United States seem to have made it difficult for 
established Japanese firms to partner in product development with more entrepreneurial and 
efficient smaller firms. 
  Having noted the problems, Japanese R&D managers are trying to respond to them.  
Conversations with Japanese R&D managers reveal several steps firms are taking to 
restructure R&D operations and improve research productivity.  This chapter presents 
evidence on the impact of one such step – the forging of technology alliances with US firms. 
 We find that this strategy leads to increased flows of technological information to Japanese 
firms.  We also present evidence that is consistent with the view that these increased 
knowledge flows raise overall inventive productivity.  This suggests that at least some of the 
responses of the private sector are having the desired impact. 
  In terms of public policy implications, we note that the Japanese government has 
undertaken a number of reforms to help Japanese firms make the leap from more applied to 
more basic R&D, including strengthening the Japanese patent system, increasing public 
expenditures on research, expanding graduate education in Japan, and removing some of the 
legal and regulatory barriers to the formation of venture capital backed start-up firms. 
However, in the context of a stagnating economy, many of Japan’s firms have been forced to 
limit their R&D spending and shift R&D personnel into operational functions – and the 
longer the recession lasts the more likely it is that these steps could have long-lasting 
negative effects on research productivity.  Perhaps the most important step the Japanese 




1 Comparative  Perspective 
 
After nearly a decade of stagnation in Japan, it is sometimes difficult to recall the unease – 
even fear – that Japan’s seemingly unstoppable economic advance during the 1980s once 
generated among US industrialists and policy makers.  To set the stage for the analysis here, 
it is worth reviewing some of the evidence on Japan’s expanding technological capability. 
                     




  As the Japanese economy expanded in the 1980s, R&D spending steadily increased.
6 
Moreover, the effectiveness with which Japanese firms applied this R&D expenditure to 
successful generation of useful inventions also seemed to be increasing.  Researchers noted 
that Japanese firms produced more patent applications per R&D dollar than US firms, and 
that this ratio was not declining, as it seemed to be in the rest of the industrialized world.
7 
  Scholars familiar with the idiosyncratic features of the Japanese patent system prior 
to its substantial reform in 1988 were quick to point out that many more patent applications 
were required to protect the same amount of intellectual property in Japan, and that 
straightforward comparisons of Japanese and US patent counts were likely to exaggerate 
Japan’s technological prowess. 
  However, because of the importance of the US market, Japanese firms were also quite 
aggressive about patenting in the United States.  Over the course of the late 1970s and 1980s, 
Japanese firms rapidly increased their level of US patenting in absolute numbers and relative 
to US counterparts.  Given that the two sets of firms were competing under the same patent 
system with the same set of rules and examiners, this seemed to buttress the case that the 
Japanese were closing the technological gap with their US rivals. 
   Careful micro studies of Japanese innovation, such as Mansfield (1988), also 
suggested that Japan’s R&D capability was formidable, particularly its applied R&D 
capability. Mansfield’s statistical results suggested that applied R&D expenditure in Japan 
had a much stronger impact on firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) growth than it did in 
the United States.  On the other hand, basic R&D spending seemed to be far less effective.  
Likewise, a comparative analysis of product development in the automobile industry in 
Japan, Europe, and the United States by Clark and Fujimoto (1991) carefully documented 
Japanese firms’ enormous lead over rivals in terms of the resource cost of product 
development. 
  The picture of expanding relative Japanese technological capability changed 
substantially in the 1990s, as Figure 1 shows.  US private sector R&D spending grew quite 
rapidly in real terms, reflecting robust macroeconomic growth and the especially rapid 
growth of high-tech industries.  In striking contrast, the increase in Japan was modest, and 
spending actually declined in two years.  The difference in trends in R&D inputs is reflected 
                     
6 Time-series on Japanese real R&D spending appears in Gijutsu Yoran (2000). 





in the aggregate statistics on R&D outputs.  For instance, the counts of patents taken out by 
Japanese firms in the United States grew much more slowly after 1990 than in the 1980s, 
whereas the reverse was true for the United States.  Figure 2 illustrates this divergence, 
aggregating across all US patent classes. 
  Figure 3 illustrates a similar pattern of convergence followed by divergence within 
the cluster of patent classes that are most closely connected to computers and information 
technologies.  Patenting levels converged up to 1988, but then, from 1993 US firms’ 
patenting in these fields exploded, greatly outstripping the growth in Japanese patents for the 
rest of the 1990s.
8  It is important to note that the relative decline in patents is seen not only 
in the US patent system.  Looking at world-wide patent applications, there have been striking 
increases in the quantity of applications from inventors based in the United States and 
Europe, but not in Japan.  Figure 4 illustrates the trends. 
  This review of aggregate statistics suggests that there is something real behind the 
steadily more insistent concerns being raised in Japan about the Japanese national innovation 
system and its comparative performance.
9    However, it also raises an important question.  Is 
the relative decline in Japanese innovative output simply a function of relative declines in 
R&D spending, or has there been a slowdown in the growth of Japanese firms’ innovative 
capacity, even after controlling for changes in R&D spending?  This question is addressed in 




2  A Micro Analysis Of R&D Productivity 
 
In this section, we utilize data collected on R&D inputs and outputs at the level of the firm to 
                     
8 Posen (2001) stresses that many of the top 10 patenting firms in the United States are Japanese multinationals.  Unfortunately, the strong 
performance of these firms is evidently not representative of the innovative performance of their industries. 
 
9  For a forceful presentation of the view that Japan’s relative innovative performance has not changed since the 1980s, see Posen (2001).  
While we strongly agree with Posen’s main point – that Japan’s poor macroeconomic performance in the 1990s has little direct connection 
with the efficiency of its R&D activity – we believe that his rather optimistic view of the Japanese innovation system is not consistent with 
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estimate a simple “knowledge production function.”
10  Let innovation for the ith firm be a 
function of its R&D input, such that 
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The δ s can be thought of as exogenous differences in the “technological opportunity” across 
c different technological fields that are stable across time.  The γ s can be thought of as 
changes in the overall effectiveness of the R&D process, common to all fields, over time.  
These latter coefficients will be crucial to our analysis.  We want to observe whether, 
conditional on R&D spending, the overall effectiveness of private sector innovative activity 
is increasing, decreasing, or unchanging over time.  Our inference concerning this will be 
based on the pattern revealed by the γ  coefficients. 
  Taking the logs of both sides of (2) yields the following log-linear equation 
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In (3), nit is innovation, rit is the firm's own R&D investment, Ds are dummy variables to 
control for differences in the propensity to generate new knowledge across technological 




2.1 Measuring  Innovation 
                     
10 The empirical methodology here borrows heavily from Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998) and Branstetter (2001a), which, in turn, are 

















t t it it D T r p µ δ γ β
 
There are no direct measures of innovation, but if some fraction of new knowledge is 
patented, such that the number of new patents generated by the ith firm is an exponential 
function of its new knowledge, 
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then the production of new knowledge can be proxied by examining the generation of new 
patents.  Taking the logs of both sides of (4) and substituting into (3) yields 
 
                                                          (5) 
 
where pit is the log of the number of new patents and the other variables are as before, except 
for the error term.  We allow the new error term to contain firm fixed effects, such that there 
can be time-invariant differences in the propensity to patent among firms within industries.  
Because firms in our sample do not change their primary industry affiliation over time, the 
industry effect would “fall out” with the firm fixed effect in a standard fixed effects 
regression. 
  As written, equation (5) suggests that the log of patent counts should be our 
dependent variable.  Some firms in our sample are observed to take out zero patents in a 
given year, which creates an obvious problem because one cannot take the log of zero.  In the 
earlier micro R&D-patents literature, it was customary to take the log of the count of patents 
plus 1 to get around this.  However, this somewhat arbitrary transformation of the dependent 
variable could bias the results. 
  Instead, we have used count data statistical models to conduct our analysis.  In 
particular, we use the fixed effects negative binomial estimator developed by Hausman, Hall, 
and Griliches (1984) to estimate a version of (5) in which a 0 realization of the dependent 






2.2 Data  Gathering 
 
To implement this approach, we collected data on the patents granted to Japanese firms in the 
United States (dated by year of patent application), patents applied for by Japanese firms in 
Japan, R&D spending, and industry affiliation.  Further information on data sources and 
construction is provided in the Appendix. 
  Is our sample reasonably representative of Japanese industrial R&D activity, and does 
this degree of “representativeness” change over time?  In Japan, R&D spending and 
patenting have historically been highly concentrated in the larger industrial firms.  A panel of 
large industrial firms in the United States would become steadily less representative of US 
patenting over the 1990s because of the rising role of universities and high-tech start-up 
firms in US inventive activity.
11 In Japan, there is no evidence of a similar shift.
12 Because 
our sample includes most of the leading R&D-performing firms in Japan, we believe it is 
representative of industrial R&D activity.   
  For our purposes, the use of US patents is actually the preferred metric of innovative 
output.  A major patent reform in Japan in 1988 allowed Japanese firms to change the 
number of claims per patent, making it at least theoretically possible for Japanese firms to 
protect the same amount of intellectual property with a smaller number of patents.  It is thus 
difficult to draw long-term inferences about changes in research productivity using Japanese 
patent application counts because the relationship between innovations and patents has 
shifted over time.
13 There was no such change in the US patent system over our sample 
period. 
  Furthermore, Japanese firms tended to submit patent applications to the US Patent 
and Trademark Office for the ideas they perceive, at least ex ante, to have the most promise, 
so that a US patent count series represents a “quality-adjusted” measure of innovative output. 
 Finally, thanks to the availability of US patent data in electronic form, it is possible to 
conduct an additional “quality adjustment” by measuring the number of citations received by 
a patent from subsequently granted patents over some fixed time period – in our case, four 
years. 
                     
11 See Hicks et al (2001), who document the increased role of smaller firms and universities in US patenting. 
12 Goto (1997) affirms this and comments on its implications for the future of industrial innovation in Japan. 





2.3  Drawing Inferences from the Data 
 
The first column of Table 1 presents results of a fixed effects negative binomial regression of 
US patent counts on firm R&D spending and our year dummy variables.  Controlling for 
R&D spending at the firm level, the coefficients on the time dummies trace out changes in 
the level of R&D output that are common to all firms.  In other words, it gives us a sense of 
how innovative output is changing, on average, after we have controlled for inputs. 
  Figure 5 graphs the pattern traced out by the time dummies, along with the 95% 
confidence bounds.  The picture that emerges is fairly striking.  From the mid-to-late 1980s, 
one sees a sharp increase in average innovative output.  This growth largely ceases in the 
early 1990s, suggesting that R&D productivity reached a plateau around 1990 and grew little 
thereafter.
14   
  Is this cessation of R&D productivity growth real or an artifact of the data?  The 
substitution of observable patents for unobservable innovation creates some problems for our 
statistical inference.  The γ  coefficients measure not just changes in the productivity of 
R&D activity over time, but also changes in the propensity to patent in the United States over 
time.  It could be, for instance, that Japanese firms are generating larger numbers of 
innovations over time but, in order to economize on the costs of protecting their intellectual 
property rights, they are being more selective about which patents they take out in the United 
States.  In other words, a count-based output measure would show a flattening of innovative 
productivity where there was none.
15 To try to get around this possibility, we constructed a 
measure of patent output in which we adjusted for the number of citations received by each 
patent up to four years after it was granted.  If the number of patents taken out in the United 
States is going down because only the upper tail of the quality distribution of innovations is 
actually being patented, then an outcomes measure that controls for innovation quality would 
be less likely to generate a spurious result of flat productivity growth. 
  The second column of Table 1 presents results from such a regression.  Figure 6 
graphs the coefficients along with their 95% confidence bounds.  The picture that emerges is 
similar to that in Figure 5.   
                     
14 Including deflated sales as an additional regressor yields results qualitatively similar to those presented here. 





  The next set of regression results segments our sample into industry groups to see 
how research productivity trends differed among industries.  Figure 7 indicates that the 
research productivity of the electronics industry, broadly defined, has continued to grow 
through the mid-1990s more or less in line with the trends of the 1980s.  In contrast, there is 
a decline in research productivity for manufacturing firms outside the electronics industry.  
That is, controlling for innovative inputs, these firms are generating less innovative output, 
on average, then they were in the late 1980s.  Regression results based on citation-adjusted 
patent output measures indicate a similar pattern. 
  Table 2 presents results based on Japanese patent applications.  If one pools data 
across all firms, these data suggest a continuing rise in innovative productivity through the 
mid 1990s, but a slowdown in growth relative to the trends of the 1980s.  Splitting the 
sample along industry lines indicates electronics firms outperformed firms in other 
industries.  In both cases, a slowdown in productivity growth is evident, occurring sooner 
among firms outside of electronics.  While there were substantial increases in R&D 
productivity in the early 1990s for electronics firms, the increase is much less impressive 
outside that sector. 
  If the number of claims is rising fast enough to offset the slowdown in the growth of 
patent applications, then one can argue that the data are consistent with increased innovation 
in both categories.  This possibility indicates the need for caution in interpreting results based 
on Japanese patent data.  For a study of Japanese innovation trends in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1988 patent reform, see Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001). 
  A breakdown of R&D productivity trends by firm size suggests that, outside the 
electronics sector, relatively smaller firms are more likely to show progress in research 
productivity than larger firms.  These findings are not reported here due to space constraints, 
but they were confirmed using US patent output data as well. 
  What can we conclude from our preliminary exploration of the firm-level data?  Our 
results suggest that changes in Japan’s absolute and relative performance are not simply or 
solely the result of a decline in firms’ R&D spending.  Although we find some evidence of 
an actual decline in research productivity in some sectors, the more robust result is that the 
broad-based increase in Japanese research productivity that was so striking in the 1980s 
largely faded in the 1990s.  The exception to this general trend is the electronics sector, 
which has continued to increase its innovative output, controlling for input. However, 




falling well their US rivals in such key patent categories as information technology.  This 
may reflect Japanese firms’ inability to match their rivals’ expanding investments in R&D. 
 
 
3  Factors Affecting R&D Productivity Growth 
 
The stereotype of Japanese firms as effective imitators and implementers rather than 
innovators may have been accurate in the late 1970s and even the early 1980s, but by the late 
1980s many Japanese firms had reached the technological frontier and their continued 
success increasingly has depended on their ability to advance that frontier.  This is captured 
in our interviews with Japanese R&D managers and industry observers, conducted in the 
United States and Japan in 2000 and 2001. 
 
3.1  The Focus and Structure of R&D Activity 
 
 Since at least the early 1980s, each interviewed company has made a substantial 
commitment to R&D at the technological frontier within its industry.  A large central R&D 
operation was built up with the aim of creating important technical breakthroughs that could 
be incorporated into future products.  Although our interviewees tended to be corporations 
recognized as technological leaders within their fields, this change in focus from applied to 
more basic R&D also is broadly reflected in larger, more representative surveys.
16 A change 
in the focus of R&D was inevitable – at one time, Japanese firms were the global low-cost 
suppliers of standardized products, but manufacturers in South Korea, Taiwan, and China are 
increasingly able to undercut Japanese firms.  This means that Japanese firms have to 
compete on the basis of innovative products.
17  The interviewed R&D managers are 
universally dissatisfied with the results of their investment in frontier research.  The view 
within firms seems to be that the central R&D laboratories have become bureaucratic, 
                     
16 See Goto and Nagata (1997), Cohen et al (1997), and the 2000 Gijutsu Yoran for evidence that the distribution of R&D effort across the 
categories of basic versus applied R&D (and process innovation versus product innovation) in the United States and Japan had essentially 
converged by the mid-1990s. 
 





insular, and unresponsive to the needs of the firm.  R&D management has been unable to 
effectively translate the basic and frontier research into effective new products.
18  The 
critiques of central R&D operations echo those by US firms in the 1980s regarding their own 
central R&D operations:  these were often seen as being unable to translate research 
advances effectively into new products.
19  In other words, a managerial perception that 
relative R&D performance has declined confirms the findings of our statistical analysis. 
  Our interviewees spoke admiringly of the way their US counterparts restructured 
their R&D operations during the 1990s, and most of the interviewed firms were trying to 
restructure along the lines of the “new” US model.  The characteristics of the new structure 
of R&D are still emerging, but conversations with Japanese corporate R&D managers 
suggest that it includes five main features. 
1  Greater reliance on R&D partnerships outside the traditional vertical keiretsu 
networks within Japan. 
2  Greater reliance on foreign (especially US) R&D partnerships and acquisitions of 
high-tech firms. 
3  Greater emphasis on cooperation with universities, domestic and foreign. 
4  A de-emphasis on centralized in-house R&D and a gradual downsizing of resources 
invested in central R&D facilities. 
5  Increased interest and investment in “corporate venturing” programs. 
  Japanese firms, in conscious imitation of their US counterparts, are placing increased 
emphasis on sourcing useful technologies from outside the firm.  These can then be 
combined with the firm’s own technical strengths to generate important new products.  This 
increased “R&D outsourcing” is probably the over-riding theme guiding departures from the 
“traditional” model of research.  As part of this, because Japan still has relatively few high-
tech start-ups, and because the quality and level of academic research in Japan typically lags 
that of the United States, Japanese firms have moved aggressively to expand their efforts to 
tap US technology networks. 
 
3.2  Reasons for a Slowdown in R&D Productivity 
                     
18 An early evaluation of the effectiveness of the build-up in R&D spending, based on an econometric study of product introductions, is 
Wakasugi and Koyata (1997). 
 





A full-fledged investigation of the reasons why the innovation trends in the United States and 
Japan have diverged so sharply is beyond the scope of this chapter, but our exchange with 
R&D managers and a review of the related literature suggests some possible explanations. 
  The nature of Japanese industrial R&D has clearly changed in terms of its 
technological focus and its organization.  First, Japanese firms have moved from a focus on 
largely applied R&D to an effort to generate more fundamental R&D breakthroughs, 
bringing them more in line with the US allocation of industrial R&D effort.  Second, in 
pursuit of this change in focus, Japanese firms have concentrated engineering talent in 
upgraded central R&D labs. 
  Prior research and comments from our interviewees suggest that the shift in R&D 
focus may have placed Japanese firms at a relative disadvantage.  As Saxonhouse has pointed 
out for decades, the Japanese higher education system produces far fewer PhDs in the 
sciences and engineering than does the US educational system.
20  Japan has produced many 
more engineering graduates at the bachelors degree level per capita, and this may have been 
sufficient to propel Japan’s technical advance while it was still behind the technology 
frontier.  However, it is reasonable to think that, as Japanese firms have reached the frontier, 
it has become more important to have technical personnel with highly specialized training. 
  In some fields, such as software engineering, the shortage of engineers with advanced 
degrees is so acute that there have been references to a “soft crisis” since the late 1980s.
21  
Even in the United States, demand for software engineers dramatically outstripped supply in 
the 1990s – but US immigration law allowed the import of hundreds of thousands of foreign 
engineers to bridge the gap.
22  
  Furthermore, evidence from US industrial patents suggests that, at least in some 
fields, US firms are increasingly building on academic science in their R&D efforts.
23  This 
also places Japanese firms at a relative disadvantage.  US high-tech firms are able to work 
with, and build on, the research of the world’s most celebrated research universities and 
institutions.  Despite important advances over the postwar period, the quantity and quality of 
                     
20 See, for example, Okimoto and Saxonhouse (1987). 
21 See Finan and Williams (1992). 
22 We thank Amar Bhide and Ashish Aurora for discussions on the role of immigration in propelling the US high-tech boom of the 1990s. 




publicly funded research in Japanese universities and research institutes typically lags behind 
that conducted in the United States.  Although the results of this kind of public science are 
generally published in easily accessible scientific journals, understanding and applying the 
most recent developments may require a degree of familiarity with, and connection to, that 
recent science that is harder to come by in Japan than in the United States.
24  
  The centralization of R&D effort in Japan runs counter to the trends in the United 
States.  Over the course of the 1990s, US firms downsized their central R&D labs and 
increased emphasis on collaboration with other firms in R&D and product development.
25
  
  Some of this collaboration is with high-tech start-up firms, often backed by venture 
capital, and successful collaboration can lead to acquisition of the start-up by its established 
partners.  For a variety of reasons, there has not been the same kind of venture capital 
activity in Japan.  This means that the domestic set of potential partners is less diverse and, 
possibly, less technologically dynamic than it is in the United States.  The larger Japanese 
corporate labs seem to have run into the same problems that beset their US counterparts – 
bureaucracy, insularity, and a lack of connection with developments in the market.  As we 
saw in our review of the aggregate statistics, total private sector R&D spending in the U.S. 
has continued to grow at a robust rate, but the allocation of that spending across 
organizational boundaries has changed in a way that has no parallel in Japan – and that may 
help explain the differences in R&D productivity. 
  To its credit, the Japanese government has instituted a number of significant reforms 
over the course of the 1990s to address some of the perceived problems in the Japanese 
innovation system and help Japanese firms make the leap from more applied to more basic 
R&D.  A series of patent reforms, begun in 1988 and culminating in the adoption by the 
Japanese Supreme Court of the “doctrine of equivalents” in 1998, have dramatically 
increased the intellectual property rights protections available to inventors under the 
Japanese patent system.
26 The government has removed a number of legal restrictions that 
inhibited the operation of high-tech start-ups.  Legal restrictions on the business activities of 
                     
24 There is a large literature on the historical role of US universities in fostering technological progress.  See, for example, Rosenberg and 
Nelson (1994). 
25 Several papers in Rosenbloom and Spencer (1996) comment on these trends, including the contribution by Mowery and Teece.   
 




university professors have been lifted, in an attempt to foster the development of university-
linked start-ups.  Finally, there has been a substantial increase in Japanese public funding for 
R&D and for graduate education.
27 Unfortunately, to date these positive policy changes have 
had little visible impact on research outcomes.    
  The positive impact of these policy changes has probably been limited by Japan’s 
poor macroeconomic performance, and this brings us to another potential explanation for the 
slowdown in R&D productivity – the long-run impact of Japan’s lengthy recession.  Because 
R&D at the technological frontier can be a very expensive investment with a highly uncertain 
payoff, firms under severe financial pressure are often forced to limit their R&D spending 
and transfer personnel out of R&D groups and into operational functions.  If Japanese firms 
are forced to restrain their R&D investments and pare back the ranks of R&D personnel year 
after year, then they inevitably fall behind their international competitors – and the further 
they fall behind, the harder it may be to catch up.  While the nation’s most successful firms 
have been able to maintain large R&D operations even in the face of Japan’s unprecedented 
recession, the long recession may have left the research operations of others permanently 
impaired.  Similarly, the viability of start-up enterprises is limited in an environment where 
the overall economy is shrinking or stagnating and equity markets are severely depressed.
28
  A full exploration of the increase in innovative activity in the US is beyond the scope 
of this paper, but recent research suggests several potentially important casual factors.  
Clearly the robust economy of the 1990s provided firms with profits to reinvest in R&D.  
However, at the same time that R&D spending has been increasing, R&D productivity as 
measured by patents per R&D dollar has also been rising, so one cannot explain the 
difference in outcomes by focusing solely on the increase in inputs. 
  The increase has probably been driven in part by changes in scientific and 
technological opportunity.  Important fundamental scientific breakthroughs in molecular 
biology, genetics, and genomics have helped fuel a sharp increase in the number of patents 
granted in fields associated with biotechnology.  Likewise, there has been a substantial 
                     
27 See Normile (2002) for a summary of these and other recent changes. 
28 There is an interesting contrast here with South Korean firms.  Under the impact of the Korean economic crisis of 1997-1998, the R&D 
divisions of several Korean firms were spun off as high-tech start-ups.  This arrangement kept South Korea’s best corporate R&D personnel 
employed in research, albeit in a different organizational form. The fraying but still extant Japanese corporate commitment to lifetime 




increase in software patenting.
29  
  Corporate patents are increasingly citing scientific papers, suggesting that the link 
between science and innovation is tighter than in the past.
30 It is uncertain whether these 
breakthroughs will continue to generate opportunities for industrial application, but it seems 
reasonable that the ability of US universities to play a leading role in these scientific 
breakthroughs has conferred some technological advantage on relatively proximate and 
better-connected US firms. 
  However, as Kortum and Lerner (1999, 2000) point out, the increase in patenting is 
not confined to those clusters of technologies that have seen recent fundamental 
breakthroughs in academic science.  Thus, one cannot argue that the increase in US research 
productivity has been driven entirely by exogenous shifts in technological opportunity.  In 
other words, it is not simply that Japan missed out on the US surge in innovation because it 
lacked a strong presence in the software industry and the biotech industry, where the positive 
technological shocks of the 1990s were concentrated.  Even in areas of traditional Japanese 
strength, US firms have been relatively more successful.  This point is driven home strongly 
in Figure 3, which tracks innovation in IT-related patent classes. 
  Instead, Kortum and Lerner argue that the management of R&D has undergone an 
institutional change.  Specifically, they assert that a system of small start-up firms financed 
by venture capital partnerships is more productive than the traditional big corporate R&D 
system, and they present evidence that the increase in innovation has been highest where 
venture capital investment is most concentrated. 
  Evidence on US patents suggests that, as the large corporate R&D labs have 
downsized, knowledge generation by smaller firms and universities have more than 
compensated.
31  The early 2000s downturn in the information-technology sector and large-
scale bankruptcies of venture-backed high-tech firms suggest that the ultimate power of this 
institutional innovation to propel increased innovation in the long run may have been 
overstated, but it is almost certain to have played an important role over the course of the 
1990s.   
  Although the failure of R&D-intensive Japanese firms to keep pace with their US 
                     
29 For recent studies touching on these issues, see Cockburn and Henderson (2000) and Hicks et al (2001). 
30 See, for example, Narin et al (1997) and Branstetter (2001c). 




counterparts is clearly a cause of concern for the firms themselves, one might question the 
implications of this for the Japanese economy as a whole.  The macroeconomic impact of 
research success should be evident in measures of total factor productivity (TFP).  While 
estimates of Japanese TFP growth vary widely, depending on the methodology and the level 
of aggregation at which the analysis was conducted, at least some studies suggest that the 
contribution of TFP growth to overall Japanese economic growth has been fairly modest in 
recent decades, even in the 1980s when research productivity was growing rapidly.  Does 
this limit the economic relevance of our study?  We would argue that Japan is unlikely to 
sustain rapid economic growth solely through increases in factor inputs in the medium-to-
long run future.  Barring radical changes in Japanese immigration policy, Japan’s population 
will age rapidly and actually begin to shrink in coming decades, sharply limiting the growth 
in labor inputs.  Likewise, if anything, Japan over-invested in physical capital in recent years 
– a point addressed elsewhere in this volume.  The prospects of investment-led growth are 
therefore also limited.  The sustainability of a reasonably high rate of macroeconomic growth 
would thus seem to require growth in TFP.
32 
  Of course, one could also question the linkage between TFP growth and domestic 
R&D.  Certainly, there are sources of TFP growth that are not directly linked to formal 
research and development activity.  Furthermore, the economic impact of slower growth in 
research productivity at home can be cushioned by importing foreign-invented high-tech 
products.  In addition, Japanese investors could realize some of the returns from foreign 
innovation by investing overseas.  However, it is still likely to be the case that both Japan 
and the world as a whole will grow more slowly if Japanese R&D productivity continues to 
stagnate.  Furthermore, modern growth theory has suggested a range of conditions under 
which foreign innovation can be an imperfect substitute for domestic innovation.
33 If these 
conditions hold, the implications of Japan’s R&D productivity slowdown for domestic 
economic growth could be even more severe.
34  
                     
32 We thank Jenny Corbett for discussions on these issues. 
33 See Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Feenstra (1996). 
34 We acknowledge that our study focuses on a relatively narrow range of firms and industries that collectively constitute a relatively small 
part of the Japanese economy.  However, these are precisely the firms and industries where formal R&D activity is most highly 
concentrated.  Given that our objective is really to assess the changing productivity of formal R&D activity – rather than explain overall 







4  Tapping US Technology 
In the face of a perceived relative decline in R&D productivity, Japanese R&D managers 
have not stood still.  While we eventually hope to explore all of the aspects of the Japanese 
industrial R&D restructuring outlined in the previous section as part of a long-term research 
project, here we focus on the international dimension of Japanese firms’ R&D restructuring.  
In doing so, we endeavor to answer two questions.  First, how and to what extent are 
Japanese firms seeking to obtain useful technological information from US sources?  Second, 
is this strategy working?  In other words, have Japanese firms that have made the effort to tap 
US technology networks benefited in terms of raising their R&D productivity?  Drawing on 
recent research by one of the authors, we seek to shed light on these questions in this section. 
  As much prior research has documented, Japanese firms have historically been 
enthusiastic licensees of US technology.  However, the concept of tapping into US 
technology networks that we attempt to measure here is more than passive implementation of 
technology developed by another firm.  Rather, it is the incorporation of ideas developed 
outside the firm into the firm’s own R&D operation.  It is much more pro-active than simple 
licensing, and an important method by which this happens is the formation of technology 
alliances with US firms.  Japanese firms’ overseas R&D facilities obviously also play an 
important role in these firms’ efforts to learn from US technological developments, but in 








4.1 Research  Alliances 
 
                     
35 For evidence on the effectiveness with which Japanese firms have used their FDI in the US, including their US R&D facilities, to tap into 
technology networks, see Branstetter (2000).  For more general studies on the scale of overseas R&D by Japanese firms, see Belderbos 




Japanese firms have been aggressive about forming technology-sharing and technology-
development alliances with US firms.  Several data sources track these over time, identifying 
the Japanese and US partners.  The source used here, the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) 
alliance database, uses contemporary press accounts to track corporate alliances, of which the 
“technology” alliances that are the focus of this section are a subset.
36  
 
4.2  Promoting Knowledge Flows 
 
Do alliances with US firms and universities promote flows of knowledge to Japanese firms?  
We assess this using data on the citations to prior US inventions found in the US patents of 
Japanese firms.  We are careful to exclude all Japanese-invented US patents from this set of 
“American” inventions.  Using an empirical methodology developed in Branstetter (2000), 
we presume that the flow of patent citations is proportional to the flow of knowledge.
37 
 Let  CJit be the number of citations made by the patent applications Japanese firm i 
filed in year t to the cumulated stock of “indigenous” US-invented patents granted as of year 
t.  Note that the US Patent and Trademark Office makes available data only on patent 
applications that are eventually granted.  In this paper, patents are dated by year of 
application rather than year of grant, because it takes on average two years – sometimes 
much longer – to grant a patent. 
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 Let  E be the expectations operator.  Here E[CJit] is a function of the number of patents 
Japanese firm i has taken out in the US in year t (NJit), the number of potentially cited 
indigenous US patents which exist as of year t (NAt), the level of firm i’s alliance activity 
with US firms in year t (Allianceit), and the extent to which firm i is at a point in the 
technology space which is “densely populated” by other indigenous US patents (PROXi). 
  Some Japanese firms might cite US patents more frequently simply because they 
                     
36 The authors subsequently began using an even more comprehensive database, the CATI database developed by John Hagedoorn at the 
University of Maastricht, to explore the impact of alliances more thoroughly. 
37 This framework builds on the methodology of Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1996) and uses the citations data described in Hall, Jaffe, and 
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happen to be working on technologies in which a large number of indigenous US inventors 
are active.  If one wishes to control for this “technological proximity,” one could obtain a 
measure of a firm's location in “technology space” by measuring the distribution of its R&D 
effort across various technological fields.  Let firm i’s R&D program be described by the 
vector F, where 
) ,..., ( 1 k i f f F =  (7) 
and each of the k elements of F represent the firm's research resources and expertise in the 
kth technological category.  These are constructed by aggregating the hundreds of patent 
classes in the US Patent and Trademark Office system into 50 distinct areas.  We then count 
the number of patents taken out by firm i in each of the categories over the full length of the 
sample period. 
  From the number of patents taken out in different categories, we can infer what the 
distribution of R&D investment and technological expertise across different technical fields 
has been.  In the same way, we can also compute a vector of location in technology space for 
the aggregate of all US inventors, treating them as though they belonged to a single giant 




  (8) 
This is a technological proximity coefficient in the spirit of Jaffe (1986).  
  One may also wish to allow citations to be influenced by the firms’ R&D spending 
(Rit) and by vectors of multiplicative “fixed effects” associated with the citing firm ( i α ) and 
the (application) year in which the citation takes place ( t α ).  Including these fixed effects 
actually simplifies the equation, provided one is willing to make some assumptions.  The 
stock of cumulated potentially citable “indigenous” US patents will be the same for all 
Japanese citing firms in each year, so that the NAt  terms are effectively absorbed into the time 
dummies.  One may also want to assume that a firm’s location in technology space relative to 
aggregate US inventive activity is relatively fixed over time.  In that case, the effect of the 
PROX measure is absorbed into the firm fixed effects in a standard fixed effects regression.  
Industry effects also will be absorbed into the firm effects, because firms in the sample do 
not change their primary industry affiliation over time. 




activity stays fixed over a long period is a strong one.  The data permit us to allow this 
proximity measure to vary within firms over time, although we lack sufficiently rich patent 
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  The focus of interest is on  3 β .  Do firms that engage in more frequent technology 
alliances and R&D joint ventures with US experience an increased tendency to cite US 
patents?  A positive, significant coefficients would suggest the answer is yes. 
  There is a data problem in that the dependent variable for a nontrivial number of 
observations is 0.  We deal with this by estimating a fixed effects negative binomial version 
of equation (9).  Results are given in Table 3. 
  We see clearly that alliances have a positive, statistically significant impact on the 
measured flow of technological knowledge from US to Japanese firms when they are entered 
separately into the regression.  Although the coefficient is small in magnitude, one must 
recall that it gives the increase in knowledge flows associated with the establishment of an 
additional alliance.  Because some firms in our data set went from zero alliances to several 
dozen, the cumulative effect implied by the regression coefficients is quite substantial.   
  Our conversations with Japanese R&D managers suggest an important 
complementarity between overseas R&D facilities and R&D alliances.  Often, overseas R&D 
centers are used as a base from which to search out alliance partners and, in many cases, the 
site of R&D centers is selected with current or potential alliance partners in mind.  In future 
work, we hope to explore this apparent complementarity further. 
 
4.3  Putting Knowledge Flows to Work 
 
The finding that the establishment of research alliances enhances knowledge flows is of 
limited interest unless firms that receive greater knowledge flows from the United States are 
able to translate these flows into greater innovative productivity.  Firmly establishing such a 
causal linkage is difficult, but in the Table 4 we present evidence that is at least consistent 
with such a linkage. 
  The first column reports the results of a fixed effects negative binomial regression.  In 
this case, the dependent variable is our citation-adjusted measure of US patent output.  We 




knowledge flows from the United States. 
  This measure is the count of citations to US patents – the dependent variable from our 
previous set of regression results.  We see clearly that US knowledge flows are positively 
associated with higher quality patent output, and that this association is robust to the 
inclusion of a control for patent counts.
38 The coefficient is very small, but the statistical 
interpretation of this coefficient is the increase in patent quality associated with an additional 
citation.  Because some firms make hundreds of such citations in a single year’s cohort of 
patent applications, the cumulative effects of a substantial increase in such citations could be 
quite substantial. 
  This point is demonstrated by the results in the second column.  The measure of 
knowledge flow used in this column is a simple dummy variable equal to one if the firm in 
question receives higher than the median level of citations over the sample period.  A random 
effects negative binomial regression shows that this variable is highly significant and large in 
magnitude, suggesting that there is a strong correlation in the cross section between high 
levels of knowledge flow and high levels of quality-adjusted patent output. Frequently citing 
firms generate patents that are nearly 90% “better,” as measured by their ex-post citations.  
We cannot interpret this as strong causal evidence of a linkage between knowledge flows 
from the United States and invention quality, because there are likely to be important 
unmeasured differences in the research quality of firms which may be correlated with the 
frequency with which they cite US patents.  Nevertheless, these results offer large sample 
statistical evidence consistent with the view expressed by our interviewees that tapping US 




As the 1980s ended, Japanese firms were held up as exemplars of strength in technological 
innovation.  As the 21st century begins, leaders in government and industry are calling for a 
reform of the national innovation system in order to raise the long-run sustainable growth 
rate of the Japanese economy.  This chapter has demonstrated that there are reasonable 
                     
38 The obvious relationship between counts of citations to prior US patents and the number of successful Japanese patent applications 
requires the use of this control.  This implies that our innovative output measure is, in effect, measuring the average quality of patents in a 




grounds for concern about the relative performance of Japanese manufacturing firms in 
technology-intensive industries. 
  To answer the question posed by our title, we do not find strong evidence that 
Japanese innovative capacity has actually declined.  However, that capacity has failed to 
grow at the rate of the 1980s.  As a result, US and worldwide patent statistics suggest that 
Japanese firms in a number of sectors have fallen behind their US counterparts, even in areas 
where Japanese firms were formerly quite strong and rapidly converging on US levels of 
inventive output. 
  Microeconometric analysis suggests that this decline in relative performance cannot 
be entirely ascribed to a relative reduction in R&D inputs, though such a relative reduction 
has occurred.  We find evidence consistent with the view that, outside the electronics sector, 
R&D productivity growth has stagnated in the 1990s – perhaps even declined.  This view is 
strongly reflected in the US patent data, and the results are robust to an adjustment for the 
quality of individual US patents. 
  Anecdotal evidence from R&D manager interviews is strongly consistent with a 
slowdown or decline in Japanese R&D productivity relative to the firms’ US competitors and 
relative to their own experience in the 1980s.  These interviews suggest that the structural 
shift in Japanese R&D over the course of the late 1980s and 1990s may have contributed to 
the observed stagnation in R&D productivity growth.  Japanese firms are not well equipped 
for more fundamental research due to the educational backgrounds of their engineers, the 
weakness of Japanese academic science, and the lack of a robust domestic venture capital 
industry. 
  Firms are taking steps to increase the efficiency of their R&D operations, and one key 
strategy adopted to varying degrees by all interviewed firms includes an increased emphasis 
on tapping US technology networks.  In the absence of strong domestic institutions, Japanese 
firms are creating ties to US universities, start-ups, and established firms.  Our 
microeconometric assessment of the impact of one of the steps taken to accomplish this 
strategic goal finds that the formation of technology-sharing alliances with US firms have a 
positive impact on knowledge flow from US to Japanese firms.  Finally, we show that 
increased international knowledge flows are strongly correlated with higher levels of 
innovative performance, at least in the firm cross-section.  Therefore, Japanese firms that 
have most successfully tapped into US technology networks enjoy a relatively higher level of 




  In terms of public policy implications, as we have already noted, the government has 
taken a number of steps to improve Japan’s academic science base and enhance the business 
environment for start-ups.  However, these policy changes are unlikely to have substantial 
positive impact until Japan’s overall macroeconomic situation improves.  While the 
downturn in innovative activity is not to blame for Japan’s poor macroeconomic 
performance, continued stagnation of the Japanese economy could have long-lasting negative 
effects on the research operations of Japanese firms. Thus, the most effective step the 
government could take in the short run to enhance Japan’s innovative performance is to 
revive economic growth.  A discussion of macroeconomic policies to accomplish that is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but we strongly concur with those who advocate the adoption 
of a positive inflation target by the Bank of Japan, tax cuts to stimulate growth, and a careful 
recapitalization of the banking system.   
  Like most empirical research projects, this essay leaves us with a number of 
unanswered (or only partially answered) questions which we hope to pursue in further work. 
 First, do our tentative explanations for the observed decline in the growth of Japanese R&D 
productivity stand up to more rigorous empirical testing?  Our current hypothesis suggests a 
negative relationship between a shift to more basic research and research productivity that 
could be explored more thoroughly.  Second, have the other dimensions of R&D reform 
mentioned in the third section been enhancing research productivity?  Our next-round 
examination of R&D restructuring by Japanese firms will consider all aspects of the process. 
 We believe that this more comprehensive study could shed useful light on the extent of the 
restructuring, the degree to which different components have had positive effects on research 
productivity, and the role that public policy could play in enhancing the evolution of the 
Japanese innovation system.   
  Our interviews strongly suggested that the move toward partial outsourcing of R&D 
is a conscious imitation of a shift that is already well underway in the United States.  A 
Japanese perspective on the global process of vertical disintegration of R&D may offer 
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The y axis is real private sector R&D spending converted into trillions of yen using OECD 
purchasing power parity exchange rates for each year. 
 























  (Units of the vertical axis are thousands of patents) 
 
The Figure shows a dramatic jump in patenting after 1997.  This may relate to a change in 
US patent law regarding the length of patents, as pointed out by Hicks et al (2001).  The law 
included a clause allowing patents filed before 8 June 1995 to receive certain procedural 
advantages.  The expiration of these patents could be set either 17 years from the grant date 
or 20 years from the priority date, whichever was later.  Patent attorneys evidently 
encouraged their clients to speed up their patent filing in order to meet this deadline.  
Because of the delays typical in the patent review procedure, an increase in patents granted 
would not be obvious in the data until two to three years after the deadline. 
 





























  (Units of vertical axis are thousands of patents) 
 
See note to Figure 2. 
 









































 (Units of the vertical axis are thousands of patents) 
 
This measures patent applications generated by inventors in the indicated country and 
submitted world-wide. 
 





Japanese R&D Productivity Trends 
 
 
Fixed effects negative binomial regression models   Obs=2,726 























































































Trends in Japanese R&D Productivity, 1982-1997
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Regression results from Table 1, Column 1 
 


























Trends in Japanese R&D Productivity
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Results after 1995 may reflect the truncation
of our citation measures
 
  
Regression results from Table 1, Column 2 
 
Year dummy coefficients from Table 1, with associated 95% confidence bounds. 
 
The sharp decline in measured productivity in the last years of our sample is an artifact of 
our data.  Detailed studies of patent citations show that it takes several years for citations to a 
particular invention to peak (see Jaffe and Trajtenberg 1996).  A patent applied for in 1996 
would not be granted, on average, until 1997 or 1998 – possibly even later.  Thus, we picking 
up less than four years’ of citations.  For this reason, coefficients on year dummies for years 
later than 1995 should be viewed with caution.  Nevertheless, we see this graph as providing 












Divergence in R&D Productivity Growth after 1989
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The measured decline after 1995 could reflect, in part, the “truncation” problem in our data 
referred to in Figure 6. Not all patents applied for in 1996 and 1997 were granted by 1999. 
 

















Table 2  Japanese R&D Productivity Trends 
Fixed effects negative binomial regression models 
using Japanese patent application data 
















































































































Log Likelihood  -15,768.6  -5,772.1  -9,941.7 






Table 3   
Measuring Spillovers to Japanese Firms 
 
Negative Binomial Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Citations     
Obs=1,857 
  Fixed Effects 
   
log R&D  -.020 
  (.014) 
   
log U.S. patents  .847 
  (.016) 
   
Proximity  .579 
  (.085) 
   
   
U.S. alliances  .004 
(.002) 
   
Time Dummies  Yes 
   
Log Likelihood  -6440.5 
   
   








Table 4   
Do Increased Knowledge Flows Raise Innovative Productivity? 
 
Negative Binomial Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Citation-adjusted patent output     
  Fixed Effects(1)  Random Effects(2) 
    
log R&D    .031    .023 
   (.021)   (.027) 
    
log real sales    .011    .101 
   (.034)   (.036) 
    
log U.S. patents    .956    .822 
    (.016)    (.021) 
    
log citations to U.S.    .0001   
Patents   (.00002)   
    
Dummy for citation  
Greater than median 
  .899 
(.096) 
    
Time Dummies  Yes Yes 
    
Log Likelihood  -6,119.5 -7,884.8 
    
Observations  2,066 2,160 











Appendix:  Data Sources 
 
This data appendix briefly describes our data sources.   
  Japanese Patent Data.  Japanese patent data are from PATOLIS, an on-line patent 
database maintained by the Japan Patent Information Organization (JAPIO).  The data are 
counts of patent applications by firm and year. 
  US Patent Data.  The data on patents taken out in the United States by Japanese firms 
are from the NBER Patent Database, described in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001).  The 
data include counts of patent grants by firm and year.  In work the patents are dated by the 
year of application rather than the year of grant.  We also include a firm-specific measure of 
patent output that is quality-adjusted by counting subsequent citations received by these 
patents, as described in the text.   
 R&D  data.  The overall R&D spending of individual Japanese firms is taken from 
several consecutive issues of the Kaisha Shiki Hō, published by Toyo Keizai, and the Nikkei 
Kaisha Jōhō, published by the Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha.  All R&D expenditure data is 
deflated by the R&D price index constructed by the Japanese Science and Technology 
Agency and reported in Gijutsu Yōran. 
  Other firm variables.  Data on firm sales and industry affiliation and are taken from 
various issues of the Japan Development Bank Corporate Finance Database.  Data on R&D 
alliances with US firms are taken from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) joint ventures 
database. 
  Sample Selection Issues.  Firms were selected on the basis of availability of a 
sufficient quantity of R&D data and patent data in both Japan and the United States.  We 
further required that there be no major jumps in such series as capital stock over the course 
of the 1980s, thereby screening out firms involved in major domestic mergers or acquisitions. 
 This means handful of large R&D performers are omitted due to data irregularities.  The 
screening tends to over-sample R&D intensive firms relative to the population as a whole.  A 
complete list of the firms in our sample and additional information on the sample are 
available from the authors on request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 